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The Realignment of Western Politics
Britain’s vote to leave the EU is part of a tectonic shift in Western politics. An 
alliance of socialists and conservatives rejected the status quo of remote bureau-
cracy, mass immigration, and multiculturalism in favor of more self-government 
and the protection of settled ways of life. (Arguably the EU is a misguided object 
of their discontent and the political geography of Brexit is more complex, as I 
show below.) A similar realignment is underway in European countries such as 
Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, and France, where it could see anti-EU parties 
force similar referenda or even seize power altogether. Europe’s social democrats 
face an existential threat as their traditional working-class base is declining and 
former voters leave in droves to support Euro-skeptic alternatives. Center-right 
Christian Democrats are outflanked by both old nationalist parties and new, insur-
gent movements that are far right on questions of identity and social cohesion and 
far left on welfare and the economy. This paradoxical convergence is perhaps best 
exemplified by Front National, whose leader Marine Le Pen calls for the depor-
tation of foreign criminals, a public works program for the indigenous working 
class, the re-nationalization of finance, an exit from the euro, and—following the 
British example—France’s withdrawal from the EU.
Similarly, the substantial support for Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 
suggests that the implicit consensus at the heart of U.S. politics—free trade, 
immigration, and a liberal world order underwritten by America’s economic and 
military might—is breaking down. Whatever their important ideological differ-
ences, both Trump and Sanders are staunchly anti-establishment and purport 
to speak for the voiceless, the angry, and the disaffected. Trump’s unexpected 
(though unsurprising) success in the primaries is based on his appeal to both work-
ing- and middle-class people who feel alienated from the mainstream parties, left 
behind by globalization, and do not want to lose their national identity. Not unlike 
Marine Le Pen, Trump combines a crackdown on undocumented immigrants with 
a promise to enact protectionism and provide public support for private enterprise 
against foreign competition.
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This wider political realignment coincides with a significant decline of the 
middle class and the end of the “American Dream”—the promise that each gener-
ation will be better off thanks to ever-more equality of opportunity, upward social 
mobility, and “trickle-down” wealth. Likewise, Brexit is so far the most dramatic 
sign that Europe’s promise of peace and prosperity on which the postwar Euro-
pean project was built no longer holds true.1 Faced with the impersonal forces of 
the global economy and national “market-states,” a growing number of ordinary 
citizens are experiencing both economic and cultural insecurity—a loss of mean-
ing and support that jobs and communities used to provide for many. In response 
to the powerlessness of people, the architects of the new politics on either side of 
the Atlantic vow to restore popular sovereignty and national self-determination. 
In this sense, the Brexit motto “Take Back Control” is of a piece with Trump’s 
pledge to “Make America Great Again.”
Thus we are seeing a parallel process in both Europe and North America—a 
reordering of politics that cannot be mapped according to the old categories of 
left versus right because they are part of the same liberal logic that is now in 
question.2 Indeed, from the 1990s onward both the center-left and the center-right 
tended to fuse economic with social liberalism, notably financial and trade liber-
alization coupled with a raft of equality legislation in support of abstract ideals 
such as diversity and inclusivity. In neither case did mainstream parties consider 
how the privileging of minority interests might affect the rest of the economy 
or the majority of society. Following the 2008 global credit crash and repeated 
civic breakdown (including urban riots from Los Angeles via London and Paris 
to Malmö), questions of ethics and culture, which the hitherto hegemonic socio-
economic liberalism had seemingly settled, have returned to the fore of politics: 
substantive rather than merely procedural justice; the common good instead of 
purely private profit or public utility; shared cultural bonds based not on individ-
ual entitlement claims but on more mutualist, reciprocal models of contribution 
and reward. Such questions are part of a new debate that can be described as 
“post-liberal”—greater economic egalitarianism and an updated version of social 
(small “c”) conservatism.
The Political Geography of Brexit
At first, the UK referendum result seems to reveal a post-liberal majority nor-
mally obscured by party divisions—a new yet natural coalition of voters who are 
economically solidarist and socially conservative, concerned with greater eco-
nomic justice and more social cohesion. However, a deeper analysis suggests that 
1. Adrian Pabst, “The Double Death of Europe,” LSE Euro Crisis, May 7, 2015, 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2015/05/07/the-double-death-of-europe/.
2. John Milbank and Adrian Pabst, The Politics of Virtue: Post-liberalism and the 
Human Future (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016), pp. 13–67.
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the divide between liberals and post-liberals cuts across the opposition between 
Leavers and Remainers. In fact, many Brexit voters supported a national libertar-
ian position with strong Thatcherite elements in the Tory shires (including small 
towns) and much of suburbia, and also among a section of the working class. 
This is particularly true for the numerous baby boomers who, after enjoying a 
protected childhood during the 1950s, went on to embrace a left-wing culture of 
unfettered desire in the 1960s that helped bring about the triumph of right-wing 
capitalism in the 1980s. A bunch of weed-smoking hippies morphed progressively 
into a generation of middle-aged, cocaine-fueled financial speculators. As mem-
bers of a “new class,”3 the baby-booming Brexiteers now seek release from EU 
constraints on free trade with the rest of the world, which is a code for an ever 
greater deregulation of labor, privatization of public services, and liberalization of 
global finance.
The other Leave constituency is composed of working-class voters who are 
often abandoned and trapped in poverty, dependent on meager state handouts 
following rapid de-industrialization in the 1980s and the absence of any proper 
regeneration in regions like the Midlands, large parts of the North (especially the 
North East), the eastern seaboard, and South Wales. These areas, where the Brexit 
vote reached sometimes more than 70 percent, are characterized by a concentra-
tion of low-skilled blue-collar workers who have been marginalized not just in 
terms of the economy but also by the socially liberal culture of the political class 
and the media. The righteous anger of these Brexiteers centers just as much on 
the lack of proper jobs, a shortage of housing, inadequate pay, and a decline in 
the provision and quality of both health care and education, as it does on the 
lack of public recognition and appreciation for their traditional ways of life, their 
patriotism, and their support for the monarchy and the armed forces. Following 
the EU’s 2004 eastern enlargement, the sudden inward migration into the UK as 
a result of European free movement of labor has not only exacerbated pressure 
on public services but also eroded a sense of shared identity in local communi-
ties and across the country. In large part this explains the 2.8 million new voters 
(compared with voter turnout in general elections) who helped swing the result 
in Brexit’s favor.
If a substantial part of the Conservative Leave vote is on the libertarian right, 
it is equally the case that a large number of Labour (or by now ex-Labour) sup-
porters who backed the exit from the EU are on the libertarian left. In this sense, 
Brexit highlights a significant and fast-growing libertarian minority that is to 
some extent helped by party politics and the centrist consensus that has dominated 
British (and U.S.) politics since the 1990s: the convergence of the two libertarian 
3. For a vivid depiction of this “new class,” see Rod Liddle, Selfish Whining Mon-
keys: How We Ended Up Greedy, Narcissistic and Unhappy (London: Fourth Estate, 2014).
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liberalisms is reflected in the more apparent than real oscillation between the lib-
eral right as the party of greed and the liberal left as the party of lust.
By the same token, the Remain vote cannot be reduced to the establishment 
and cosmopolitan liberal elites who despise tradition and the more small-“c” con-
servative outlook not just of the provinces but also of many people in urban, even 
metropolitan areas such as London. Indeed, the capital, where the winning margin 
for Remain was the largest in the country, has some of the highest levels of social 
capital and religious practice (cutting across class, color, and creed), as do areas 
such as Cambridge and its surroundings as well as the Cotswolds north of Oxford.4 
Nor was the pro-EU vote confined to the urban, metropolitan population of Lon-
don, Liverpool, or Manchester. On the contrary, Remain did well across Scotland 
and Northern Ireland as well as in parts of the North West and Yorkshire.
In short, the Brexit vote does not fit neatly a narrative of binary categories 
such as the metropolis versus the provinces, urban versus rural, rich versus poor, 
young versus old, business versus workers, north versus south—even if Remain 
tended be associated with more highly skilled affluent city-dwellers while Leave 
was concentrated among low-skilled working-class voters. Rather, the referendum 
result reveals a new divide between libertarians and post-liberals that cuts across 
the opposition of Remainers and Leavers. This new divide reflects the culture wars 
that have been raging below the political radar for some time. While this tends 
to be couched in terms of the conflict of “cosmopolitan” versus “provincial,” it 
is far more accurate to say that these culture wars are about a clash between an 
aggressively amoral libertarian liberalism and the more small-“c” conservative 
disposition and common decency of ordinary people who hold dear the kind of 
things that both Brussels and London elites have dismissed as anachronisms: tra-
dition; a respect for settled ways of life; a sense of local place and belonging; a 
desire for home and rootedness; the continuity of relationships at work and in 
one’s neighborhood and local community; a sense of pride and patriotic solidar-
ity; the importance of national language and cultural traditions in the face of an 
aggressively capitalist monoculture. Since libertarians oscillate between abstract 
cosmopolitanism, economic globalism, and ethnic nativism all at once while 
post-liberals seek to combine patriotism with an internationalist outlook, post-
liberalism can be the new center ground of Western politics.
A New, Post-liberal Era?
The paradoxical blending of conservative with socialist ideas has the potential 
to win a popular, parliamentary majority provided that one of the two main par-
ties abandons the centrist consensus or else a new party is created. So far the 
only post-liberalism on offer in Britain seems to be that of the United Kingdom 
4. John Milbank, “Divided Island: Brexit, Religion and Culture,” ABC Religion & 
Ethics, July 12, 2016, http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2016/07/12/4499021.htm.
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Independence Party (UKIP) led until recently by Nigel Farage, but in reality it 
is both anti-liberal and in league with economic liberalization. UKIP promotes 
nationalism and atavistic ethnocentrism as exemplified by the Brexit campaign 
poster featuring a long queue of Syrian refugees in Slovenia with the headline 
“Breaking Point: The EU has failed us all.” The party also pretends to defend 
the working classes abandoned by Labour while in fact seeking more free trade, 
greater freedoms from regulation for the City of London, and a privatized health 
care system, all of which would hurt the unemployed and the working poor most 
of all. Indeed, they would be hit hardest by being increasingly exposed to the 
forces of global capital that UKIP wants to unleash in its quest to recreate a fan-
tasized Anglosphere.
Herein lies the tragic irony of Brexit: the winners of the referendum are the 
losers of the political economy of the twenty-first century, which the exit from 
the EU is likely to exacerbate especially if the more small-“c” conservative com-
mitment of many Brexiteers is undermined by the “national libertarian” outlook 
of many other Brexiteers—the restoration of full national sovereignty (and there-
fore a near-complete withdrawal from the EU’s single market) but with maximal 
free trade and more power to global finance unhampered by matching political 
structures. Far from being post-liberal, this national libertarianism has made dem-
agogic use of legitimate popular fears about the impact of immigration to advance 
an ultra-liberal economic project and a socially reactionary agenda.
The real alternative to empty liberal-cosmopolitan globalization and anti-
liberal nationalism is a post-liberal vision that can underpin a commitment to 
greater economic justice and social harmony with an appropriate political econ-
omy. Post-liberalism does not so much intend to offer mere compensation for the 
side-effects of global capitalism as to provide fundamental reforms that would 
begin to change the nature of the market itself by aligning the executive with the 
long-term interests of the company, its shareholders, employers, and consumers. 
In this manner, the alternative to economic liberalism in capitalist countries such 
as the UK is not an overweening state but rather (and with much present irony) a 
more continental European system of company governance and ethos that favors 
mutual benefit over an Anglo-Saxon “winner-takes-all” mentality.
Although not all post-liberals would agree, a UK detached from the inter-
national political project of the EU would hardly be able to protect a post-liberal 
agenda from the forces of anarchic global capital that would be happy to see Lon-
don as a northern Dubai, surrounded by a servile desert remainder of erstwhile 
England. No doubt the British economy needs internal rebalancing toward more 
manufacture, yet when linked with the European economy it is already somewhat 
more balanced in favor of industry, science, and the creative industries, which all 
benefit from substantial EU funds—besides its symbiosis with Continental manu-
facturing and agriculture. Without this balancing the danger of it becoming just 
an offshore tax haven, home to ever more gangsterish finance, is overwhelming.
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It follows that a more European approach to the market requires Brexit to 
be either prevented or else neutralized, for example by combining free move-
ment of people with an emergency break on cheap migrant labor and transition 
controls used by other EU member states following eastern enlargement (ideas 
to which I will return below). Nor would prevention be out of keeping with post-
liberalism, since its organic and tradition-respecting approach should not accord 
a Girondist legitimacy to a partly manipulated popular verdict that permanently 
overrides the sovereignty of crown in Parliament. The process of reintegrating a 
nation cannot be separated, as Edmund Burke understood, from the process of 
sustaining and increasing its integration with the continent and culture of which 
it is inalienably a part:
It [Europe] is virtually one great state having the same basis of general law; with 
some diversity of provincial customs and local establishments. The nations of 
Europe have had the very same christian [sic] religion, agreeing in the funda-
mental parts, varying a little in the ceremonies and in the subordinate doctrines. 
The whole of the polity and oeconomy [sic] of every country in Europe has been 
derived from the same sources. It was drawn from the old Germanic or Gothic 
customary; from the feudal institutions which must be considered as an emana-
tion from that customary; and the whole has been improved and digested into 
system and discipline by the Roman law. . . . From this resemblance in the modes 
of intercourse, and in the whole form and fashion of life, no citizen in Europe 
could be altogether an exile in any part of it. There was nothing more than a 
pleasing variety to recreate and instruct the mind; to enrich the imagination; 
and to meliorate the heart. When a man travelled or resided for health, pleasure, 
business or necessity, from his own country, he never felt himself quite abroad.5
However much the EU in its current configuration undermines the “community 
of culture” that Burke describes so strikingly, it remains the only political expres-
sion of Europe’s shared cultural legacy and thus far the most ambitious attempt 
to build a new plural polity beyond ancient empires and modern states—starting 
with a new political economy that overcame the liberal oscillation between free 
trade and protectionism under the aegis of a hegemonic power (the Dutch Repub-
lic, followed by the British Empire and then the United States).
Europe’s Postwar Project
The postwar European project came into existence to resist the three forces that 
had devastated Europe in the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury: economic nationalism, the free-market ideology of laissez-faire capitalism, 
and the state corporatism of the communist, fascist, and national-socialist regimes. 
5. Edmund Burke, “The First Letter on a Regicide Peace,” in Burke: Revolutionary 
Writings, ed. Iain Hampsher-Monk (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014), p. 317.
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Europe’s founding fathers were more inspired by Christian social teaching than 
by secular ideology.6 They inaugurated cooperation between former enemies in 
agriculture and in coal and steel, and built coalitions among trade unions, busi-
nesses, and the churches. Underpinning this new economic model was a substantive 
conception of the common good based on bringing hitherto estranged interests 
into a new negotiated institutional settlement. Especially in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, the social market economy that was supported by both Christian and 
Social Democracy embodied many principles of Catholic Social Thought.
One way to characterize the post-1945 European project is in terms of a triple 
triad. First, vocation, value, and virtue: a vocational labor market in Germany, 
the Netherlands, and parts of France and Italy (combined with regional banks 
and local government) sustained a more balanced and diversified economy that 
tended to produce goods and services of value serving the needs of people. This 
model also provided many incentives to virtue rather than vice: shared benefit, 
generosity, and a high degree of trust and cooperation instead of greed, selfish-
ness, distrust, and conflict. The experience of the trentes glorieuses was as much 
to do with postwar reconstruction as it was about a new balance of rival interests 
in pursuit of the common good.
Second, solidarity, subsidiarity, and status: the early European project focused 
on real, interpersonal solidarity between agriculture, manufacturing, industry, 
and services. The much-maligned Common Agricultural Policy—in its original 
version—defended small-holding farms and their important social and cultural 
role against industrialized agriculture and its links to big food-processing and 
wholesale businesses, which squeezed farmers and independent shops. Co-deter-
mination in industry represented subsidiarity in action and was also a cornerstone 
of cooperation between countries that had been at war for much of the previous 
two centuries. The status of workers and peasants was central, affording them not 
just an income to feed themselves and their families, but also a public recognition 
of their vital contribution to society.
Based on a process of reconciliation between Germany and its erstwhile 
enemies, the post-1945 settlement gave rise to a new era of peace, prosperity, 
and partnership—the third triad. Europe sought to learn the lessons of centuries 
of war between rival colonial powers and sovereign states by inaugurating a 
new kind of cooperation with the aim of bringing about an “ever closer union 
of peoples and nations,” as the preamble of the 1957 Rome Treaty states. In an 
attempt to avert the bloodshed of inter-state war and stop unmediated economic 
competition from turning into conflict, Europe’s founding fathers sought to build 
a different type of polity, which can be described as a subsidiarist and reciprocalist 
commonwealth that pools sovereignty and embeds states and markets in strong 
6. Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge UP, 2007).
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intermediary institutions in order to counterbalance global capital and central-
ized bureaucracy. To an extent the European postwar project managed to provide 
a balance between free trade and protectionism through regional and structural 
funds in ways that tempered both nationalism and the impersonal forces of 
unmediated globalization.
However, at the heart of postwar Europe was also an ambiguity from the 
outset—the primacy of economics and politics over society and culture. This pri-
macy goes back to the “Monnet method” of supranational integration that was 
already enshrined in the 1957 Rome Treaty, which is also known as “neo-func-
tionalism”—the idea that ever more economic exchange and legal uniformity will 
over time produce political unification. Monnet’s neo-functional approach fused 
Napoleonic directives with German “Ordo-liberal” thinking, which since the late 
1960s has differed from Catholic Social Thought in that it privileges legal posi-
tivism and procedure over coalitions of interest in a quest for the common good.7 
Europe’s “original sin” was the failure to develop a shared political economy that 
would extend the virtues of the German social market model to the rest of the 
EU, while correcting the vices of Ordo-liberalism—too much emphasis on cen-
tral rules and regulations, too little emphasis on the social purpose of investment 
and competition.
Germany has managed to preserve many elements of the social market, includ-
ing worker representation on company boards, regional banks, farm subsidies, an 
industrial policy, and a vocational labor market. But neither the Christian nor the 
Social Democrats resisted the neo-liberal takeover of German Ordnungspolitik, 
especially the pursuit of austerity and price stability that in the context of the 
eurozone leads to deflation and depression. The tragedy of the EU is that Germany 
has exported its ethics and politics rather than its economy: Kantian morality of 
context-less duties, Weberian statecraft void of virtue, and Bismarckian quasi-mil-
itary management of citizens through centralized welfare. Reinforced by French 
dirigisme and bureaucratic diktat, the Franco-German marriage has engendered a 
Europe that is abstract, administrative, and alien vis-à-vis its citizens just because 
it is founded more upon formalism, legalism, and rationalism than it is upon sub-
stantive unity, judgment, and a fuller conception of reason. A richer rationality 
reconnected with habit, feeling, and faith can correct the instrumental rationality 
of both capitalism and bureaucracy.
To Europe’s “original sin” one can add the “cardinal vice” of the 1985 Single 
European Act so beloved of Mrs. Thatcher and her successors as British prime 
minister. Far from creating a free market liberated from Napoleonic directives, 
7. Certain strands of Ordo-liberalism—in particular the work of Wilhelm Röpke, 
Alexander Rüstow, and, more recently, Werner Lachmann—are infused with Catholic 
Social Thought and cognate traditions in Protestantism, whereas other versions embrace 
more Weberian and Kantian ideas.
 BREXIT, POST-LIBERALISM, AND THE POLITICS OF PARADOX  197
it progressively replaced Europe’s common market, which rests on the mutual 
recognition of national diversity (with some basic minimum standards) that is 
negotiated predominantly by the individual member states, with a single market 
that promotes top-down harmonization giving all power to the Commission and 
the Court of Justice. In practice, the EU put in place a regulatory regime that 
imposes uniform standards across all member states, whereas before EU directives 
required some minimal harmonization of European law but also had the effect of 
banning restrictive regulation in countries that interfere with healthy competition 
within and between countries. Ironically, the UK’s insistence on enlarging the EU 
rapidly and on extending the single market to ever more sectors has reinforced the 
unmediated movement of capital and labor by weakening the mutual protection 
between regions and nations that the European project originally provided.
Connected with this is the EU interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity. 
In Article 5 of the EU Treaty and other texts, subsidiarity implies that the Union 
is obliged to take action wherever it has an advantage in terms of scale or effect. 
Not only does this invert the burden of proof and raise question over who has the 
legitimate authority to decide,8 but it also hollows out the primacy of society over 
the economy. From the family via intermediary institutions all the way up to the 
nation, the primacy of the social over the economic is central to Christian social 
teaching (and cognate traditions such as guild socialism or One Nation conserva-
tism). As a result of EU legalism and proceduralism, subsidiarity has become an 
engine of centralization when it was supposed to be a device for devolving power 
to people.
Thus EU centralism is neither necessary nor inevitable. It was the outcome 
of contingent political decisions to fuse Anglo-Saxon free-market economics 
with continental bureaucratic statism, which successive EU member states and 
the Community institutions in Brussels have taken further. It is this European 
“market-state” that lacks political direction, economic vitality, social cohesion, 
and civic consent and that was rejected in the Brexit vote.
A New European Settlement
After Brexit, the EU could either evolve into a super-state (composed of the 
eurozone core) or lapse into a glorified free-trade area, or it could disintegrate 
altogether. Confronted with the threats of terrorism, economic depression in 
the eurozone periphery, and the impact of mass immigration, the EU faced an 
existential crisis well before Britain’s decision to leave because the dominant 
neo-functionalist model of integration and enlargement eroded the social-cultural 
8. Philip Booth and Diego Zuluaga, “Subsidiarity needs to take its rightful place in 
the EU,” Reimagining Europe, February 24, 2016, http://www.reimaginingeurope.co.uk/
subsidiarity-needs-to-take-its-rightful-place-in-the-eu-2/.
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foundations upon which the European polity rests.9 In recent years, the dynamic 
of disintegration reached a new level, as Schengen and the euro have served to 
undermine civic consent and public trust in the European project. There is a very 
real risk that Brexit could precipitate the unraveling of the EU, starting with the 
British Union and followed by exit referenda in countries with strongly Euro-
skeptic parties—including Denmark, Austria, the Netherlands, France, and Italy. 
Anti-EU forces such as UKIP or the Front National are determined to bring down 
the Community institutions in Brussels and return to a more Hobbesian and Lock-
ean world of international anarchy wherein the political and economic power of 
sovereign states and transnational markets trumps a more Burkean polity of com-
mon cultural customs and mores.
For this reason, turning the EU into a mere free-trade zone is the wrong answer 
to Brexit because increasingly unfettered free trade between sovereign nations 
will perforce require the creation of a super-state to prevent any national pro-
tectionism from reemerging, which is why the common market based on mutual 
recognition has mutated into the single market with top-down harmonization. 
Such a super-state would also exacerbate the corrosive effects of globalization on 
national identity and the economy precisely because the modern state—whether 
at the national or the supranational level—is constituted through its centralizing 
tendency to suppress regional and linguistic differences in ways that over time 
provoke a popular backlash.
Amid popular revolts already at work in the decisive defeat of the 2005 Con-
stitutional Treaty by Dutch and French referenda, both national and EU elites 
have quietly abandoned the old federalist dream of a United States of Europe or 
a core Europe.10 Advocates of exit referenda nevertheless assert that the EU is 
bound ever more to centralize and be dominated by both big business and big gov-
ernment. They cite in support of their claim the 2015 report of the five presidents 
of the EU institutions, which calls for the strengthening of the monetary union 
by 2025, the creation of a eurozone treasury, and a move to full-blown political 
union. The pro-exit case rests on the claim that this will hijack the whole Union 
(including non-euro members such as Denmark, Poland, and, for the moment, 
Britain) and that, unlike national governments, EU power is—and always will 
be—unaccountable and undemocratic.
However, the Five Presidents’ Report, far from offering a road map to the 
future, is a relic of a moribund conception of a supranational Europe wherein the 
European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of Ministers 
9. Adrian Pabst, “Commonwealth or Market-State? Europe’s Christian Heritage and 
the Future of the European Polity,” in Gary Wilton and Jonathan Chaplin, eds., God and the 
EU: Faith in the European Project (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 109–28.
10. Charles Grant, “Unnoticed by Brexiteers, the Idea of an EU Super-state Is Quiet-
ly Dying,” Daily Telegraph, June 17, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/16/
unnoticed-by-brexiteers-the-idea-of-an-eu-super-state-is-quietly/.
 BREXIT, POST-LIBERALISM, AND THE POLITICS OF PARADOX  199
would replace the executive and legislative branches of the member states—a 
French project to which Mrs. Thatcher famously said three times non. Today 
a centralized super-state has no mainstream political or popular support in any 
member state—not even the eurozone countries that are unwilling to agree to even 
a banking union, never mind a fiscal or a political union. Since the failed Consti-
tutional Treaty, power has in reality flown from the supranational level back to the 
intergovernmental level. Echoing Margaret Thatcher’s 1988 Bruges lecture, Ger-
man Chancellor Angela Merkel argued in the same place in 2010 that the future 
of the EU lies with the “union method” of coordinated action by national govern-
ments, as opposed to the “community method” of automatic supranationalism 
favored by Delors and, before him, Jean Monnet. That is why all the major deci-
sions on eurozone bailouts and the refugee crisis have been taken by Germany, 
sometimes in concert with France and other big member states.
At the same time, no country has an innate right to lead the EU. France retains 
military might, but her stagnant economy and deeply divided politics highlight the 
existential crisis that is engulfing the Fifth Republic, while Germany is the Union’s 
economic powerhouse but lacks the means to direct foreign and security matters. 
A full Brexit would leave the remaining member states exposed to a German 
hegemony that Germany does not want and everybody else fears. A loose confed-
eration of sovereign states as demanded by Euro-skeptics in some of the new EU 
member states such as Poland or Hungary might avert centralization, but it would 
be powerless to counteract protectionist reactions or provide a strong European 
presence in the world. Thus the only genuine alternative to centralization and 
disintegration is the transformation of the EU into a proper commonwealth of 
nations and peoples—a multinational association that shares risks, rewards, and 
resources based on blending contribution with solidarity and pooling sovereignty 
(according to a substantive conception of subsidiarity) in areas where collective 
action provides mutual benefits for all. Up to a point the EU is already a plural 
polity of overlapping and concentric circles, multiple jurisdictions, polycentric 
authority, and hybrid institutions that can resist both a centralized super-state and 
a fantasized free-trade area.
However, the Brexit vote provides an opportunity to build a new European 
settlement that addresses legitimate popular fears about the impact of global capi-
tal and mass migration on the EU as a whole—not just Britain—by reforming free 
movement of labor and enhancing the legitimacy of EU institutions. The main 
problem with free movement of people within the EU is that it is unsustainable 
in an era of major economic dislocation and mass inward migration from out-
side Europe. With Schengen already suspended indefinitely, now is perhaps the 
final chance to revise the rules governing the free movement of labor before the 
EU disintegrates. No member state wants to curtail the ability of citizens of one 
country to study, seek work, or retire in another, but there are several countries—
including Germany—that want to overhaul the provisions on access to benefits 
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and the automatic right to remain in another member state without a job (and 
without the capacity to support yourself in the absence of state assistance). A 
post-liberal response to Brexit is to transform social security in all EU countries—
especially Britain—in the direction of a contributory system wherein contribution 
is the basis for entitlement and non-remunerated activities such as caring for rela-
tives or voluntary work in the community are honored.
In the short and medium term, member states such as the UK that face 
pressures on public services, housing, and health could be allowed to use an 
“emergency brake” on inward migration for a duration of seven to ten years, 
which is how long the temporary derogation used by Germany lasted following 
the 2004 EU eastern enlargement. While the governments of Poland, Hungary, 
and other central and eastern European countries might object, such an emergency 
brake and other safeguard measures are already part of EU treaties, and they help 
new member states limit brain-drain. Such a deal could even keep Britain in the 
single market and avoid a full withdrawal that would be mutually diminishing. 
In exchange for access to the single market and a ten-year limit on immigration, 
the UK would still make a contribution to the EU budget (albeit at a reduced rate) 
and lose its influence over the rules on the single market if it chose to become an 
associate member.
Amid the crisis of legitimacy, the EU needs to renew the founding vision of 
a reciprocalist and subsidiarity polity that reconnects supranational institutions 
much more closely to nations, regions, localities, communities, and even neigh-
borhoods. Central to such a transformation is a change in the current balance of 
power that gives the unelected European Commission the sole right to initiate 
laws, while the Council of (nationally elected) Ministers decides but does not exe-
cute policies. The first reform should be to recognize the council as the supreme 
executive power of the EU and to restore the commission to its original role of 
a European civil service that acts as a secretariat to the council in an advisory 
function, overseeing the implementation of common regulations and mediating 
among competing national and sectional interests. Second, the judicial activ-
ism of the European Court of Justice could be curtailed by further limiting the 
cases it hears and restricting its power to that of an arbiter, not a missionary that 
serves to transfer competencies from member states to the commission. Third, the 
European Parliament lacks legitimacy because it is disconnected from national 
political classes. The lower chamber of elected members could be supplemented 
by an upper chamber composed of representatives from national parliaments, 
professions, regions, and cities (by fusing the existing Regional Committee of 
the EU with its Economic and Social Committee). A Parliament that represents 
European society—not just individual constituents—can command greater civic 
assent while also better exercising its primary purpose of scrutinizing legislation 
and holding the executive to account.
 BREXIT, POST-LIBERALISM, AND THE POLITICS OF PARADOX  201
The West’s Post-liberal Moment
The current realignment of Western politics beyond the liberal consensus has seen 
the emergence of both anti- and post-liberal movements. The technocracy and 
liberal-cosmopolitan outlook of ruling elites will continue to provoke popular 
anger and fuel the flames of far-left and far-right demagogy and soft fascism. 
Arguably this anti-liberalism is in secrete collusion with liberalism because the 
latter’s promotion of free trade, globalization, and the unity of a global cosmopolis 
is dialectically linked with protectionism, atavistic ethno-centrism, and even rac-
ism, as well as the anarchy of rival nation-states based on a doctrine of absolute 
sovereignty. Far from seeing either the “end of history” or a “clash of civiliza-
tions,” we are witnessing the splintering of the liberal world order into different 
forms of plutocratic populism variously linked to a global financial oligarchy, the 
criminalization of government, and almost everywhere the bending of the rule of 
law to serve narrow sectional interests.
The liberal and anti-liberal oscillation between statist order and capitalist 
anarchy offers a unique chance for mainstream parties across the West to adopt a 
post-liberal vision. Post-liberalism can underpin a new consensus around the com-
mon good and incentives to virtue by developing a politics of culture, belonging, 
and mutual recognition (based on the principle that duties beget rights) and also 
by making reciprocity the governing principle of both society and the economy 
(based on the idea of contribution and just desert). The task is to build cross-class 
and cross-cultural coalitions that can reconnect elites with the majority, bring 
estranged interests into a negotiated settlement, and foster a sense of virtuous 
leadership across the whole of society. Both the center-left and the center-right 
need to return to their respective core purpose of ensuring that a broad alliance 
of citizens is represented at the tables of power in politics and the economy. To 
outflank both liberals and anti-liberals, post-liberals have to craft a renewed 
civic patriotism that is rooted in a narrative of hope and an ethical critique of 
the excesses of both capital and bureaucracy. What politics requires is a public 
philosophy of the common good articulated in a generous story about national 
renewal and the renewal of the West’s best traditions.
